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*civil courts.2' The Court dismisses the prisoners' claim of deprivation of
"due process of law" by the rationale that; the "due process" clause cannot
justifiably apply to enemy aliens where American soldiers do not have a
commensurate right, 22 nor would it be fair to offer use of our courts to
aliens where there would be no equivalent reciprocity from the foreign
state to our soldiers.
-5
The dissent contends that the majority ruling has created a paradox in
the law. 24 If a prisoner of war were to be confined within the territory of
the United States lie would be allowed his hearing, 25 but if the Government
chose to imprison him outside the courts' territorial jurisdiction he would
be denied it on the basis of the present decision.2 6 It goes on further to
state that the Supreme Court, in refusing jurisdiction, has abdicated its
sole means of checking upon the actions of military tribunals.2 7
Apparently, as a result of the instant decision, the military commissions,
outside the jurisdiction of any federal court, are now a separate and distinct
unit empowered to function without any review by the judicial system, but
past decisions 28 show that it is not unusual to leave expansive powers in
other parts of the Government during time of war. It is problematical
whether the courts will again be concerned with this problem in view of
the possibility that the United Nations will, in the future, take jurisdiction
over such prisoners. As in the Korean situation, war will most likely be
carried on under color of authority of the United Nations. Punishment of
the perpetrators of war will be the manifest responsibility of that organiza-
tion, and the United States, if it establishes military tribunals for such pur-
poses, will only be doing so as its agent.
JUDGES-PENSIONS-WAIVER WHILE HOLDING
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICE
A retired judge of the state of Florida received retirement pay' from
a fund, established by statute,2 to which contributions were voluntarily
made, The state constitution provided that if he filed a certificate of willing-
ness, a retired judge could be recalled to active duty.A Upon appointment
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 947.
23. Id. at 944.
2-4. Id. pt 952 (dissenting opinion).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 958(dissenting opinion).
28. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1943); United States v. Ctrtiss-\Vright
IExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1. Retirement pay, as distinguished from a pension, is received from a fund to which
employee contributed. See Raines v, Board of Trustees, 365 1. 610, 7 N.I'2d 489
(1937).
2. FLA. STAT. § 38.14 (1949).
3. Fk.. CONsr. Art. 5, § 49 (erroneously numbered § 46 by the legislature).
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to the bench of a United States court, the judge requested a declaratory
decree as to the effect upon his retired status of accepting the federal ap-
pointment. Held, that the retired judge, having withdrawn his consent to be
recalled to active duty for the state, may remit retirement pay while serving
as an official of the United States, and retain his right to resume the retired
status4 and to again receive retirement pay provided by state law. Gay v.
Whitehurst, 44 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1950).
There is a definite conflict of opinion whether compliance with the
statutory requirements for retirement with pay gives an officer a vested
right, to retire a/id draw the retirement compensation, which cannot after-
ward be revoked or impaired. 5 In most jurisdictions the courts have held
that legislative bodies retain the right to amend or repeal the provisions of
statutes creating pension funds,0 permitting the legislative body to abolish
the fund at will.' These decisions are based on the objection to compelling
the governmental unit to continue a policy or program after the conditions
under which it was originated have changed.8 Therefore, a retired officer
does not have an absolute vested right to a pension or to retirement pay'0
Thus, there is a limitation on the several theories which give an officer
somewhat vested rights, once the conditions of the system are met." These
are rights only under conditions set by the legislative body, with no right
to receive any specified sum or terms and conditions of payment.' 2 The lim-
ited rights are derived from serveral theories. Under'one, the pension laws
constitute either implied terms in the employment contract,' 3 or the terms
of a separate unilateral contract accepted by fulfilling the statutory require-
ments.14 Another theory is that a pension is compensation, for which the
employee contracted as an annuity,'6 or which was withheld to induce long
4. Ibid. (In this status a retired circuit judge is qualified to perform his former
duties when called upon.)
5 , 3 MCQUILLIN ON MUNIcIPAL CoRPouL rzoNs, § 12.144 (2d ed. 1940);. see 23
MulN. L. REv. 540 (1939).
6. Pennie v. Ries, 132 U.S. 464 (1889); Voorhees v, Miami, 145 Fla. 402, 199
So. 313 (1940); Holton v. Tampa, 119 Fla. 556, 159 So. 292 (1934) (but cannot
deprive of all pay through segulation).
7. Dallas v. Trammell, 129 Tex. 150, 101 S.W.2d 1009 (1937).
.8. Holton v. Tampa, supra note 6; Dallas v. Trammell, supra note 7.
9. Holton v. Tampa, supra note 6; Vo9rhees v. Miami, supra note 6; Dallas v.
Trammell, supra note 7.
10. Dallas v. Trammell, suptra note 7; of. Ramnes v. Board of Trustees, 365 Ill. 610,
7 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1937).
11. Voorhees v. Miami, supra note 6; Roddv v. Valentine, 268 N.Y. 228, 197 N.E.
260 (1935); Dallas v. Trammell, supra note 7.
12. Holton v. Tampa, supra note 6.
13. Dallas v. Trammell, supra note 7.
14. Anders v. Nicholson, Ill Fla. 849, 150 So. 639 (1933); Raines v. Board of
Trustees, supra note 10; Roddy v. Valentine, supra note 11; Griehlc v. Board of Man-
agers, 105 Pa. 452, 161 At. 588 (1932).
15. Holton v. Tampa. supra note 6; McBride %-. Retirement Board of Alleglaiag
County, 330 Pa. 402, 199 Atl. 139 (1938).
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and faithful service. 1 A different theory is that there has been reliance on
the promised bounty or gift of the state. 17
However, there may be a definite vested right to receive retirement pay,
once the statutory conditions have been complied with, which cannot be
altered by legislative act I8 or by constitutional amendment. 19 The rights
to participate in a fund to which the employee voluntarily contributed are
usually vested, 20 while limited rights are allowed when no contributions or
mandatory contributions are made.21 Sometimes retired officers are required
to waive pension payments, without jeopardy to pension status, while em-
ployed in public office. 22 Also, payment of pensions has been allowed to
retired officers drawing compensation as governmental officials. 23  There-
fore, a retired officer's rights to retirement pay, while usually limited, some-
times are definite and vested. Both lines of authority use the same reason-
ing without drawing distinctions which would justify the diverse conclus-
ions.
Most Florida cases2 4 construe pension regulations liberally in favor of
the employee, with the intent of the legislature controlling.25  The instant
case appears to extend the law so as to definitely include this state among
those which give a vested right to draw retirement compensation, without
legislative change, once statutory requisites have been met.26 The court
then held that a vested right can be waived.2 7 So the pension can be waived,
and later resumed. Under the controlling statute2 after the requirements
are met, the officer can voluntarily retire and receive pay. The state con-
stitutional amendment 20 permits the judge to voluntarily assume the special
retired status under which he is subject to call when needea. It appears
that voluntary return to active duty would not cause forfeiture of retire-
ment pay or status when the duty was terminated. Since the constitution
16. Voorhees v. Miami, supra note 6; DeWolf v. Bowley, 355 111. 530, 189 N.E.
893 (1934).
17. (e;ddes v. United States, 38 Ct. CI. 428 (1903).
18. Anders v. Nicholson, supra note 14; Roddy v. Valentine, supra note 11.
19. See McBride v. Retirement Board, note 15 supra, at 132.
20. State ex tel Stringer v. Lee, 147 Fla. 37, 2 So.2d 127 (1941); Anders v. Nichol-
son, supra note 14; Raines v. Board of Trustees, supra note 10.
21. Holton v. Tampa, supra note 6; Raines v. Board Trustees, supra note 10; Turner
v. Passaic Pension Comm'n, 10 N.J. Misc. 1270, 163 AU. 282 (1932). Contra: McBride
v. Retirement Board, sulra note 15.
22. Turner v, Passaic Pension Comm'n, supra note 21; Crieble v. Board of Man-
agers, supra note 14.
23. Geddes v. United States, supra note 17. Cf. Furgueson v. LaGuardia, 281 N.Y.
678, 23 N.E.2d 14 (1939) (received amount he had paid in, plus interest); Stringer v.
Lee, supra note 20; Roddy v. Valentine, suopra note 11; Lamb v. Boone, 237 Iowa 273,
21 N.W.2d 462 (1946); McBride v. Retirement Board, supra note 15.
24. Stringer v. Lee, supra note 20; Voorhees v. liami, s/ pra note 6; Holton v.
Tampa, supra note 6; Anders v. Nicholson, supra note 14.
25. 3 MCQUILLIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, suprta note 5, at 504.
26. Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1950).
27. Ibid. See Turner v, Passaic Pension Comm'n, supra note 21; Grieble v. Board
of Managers, su ra note 14.
28. FLA. STAT. t 38.14 (1949).
29. Ft. CONST. Art. 5, § 49.
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states that he cannot be required to serve against his will, it would seem to
permit him to refuse to serve at any time he might be called upon, for ex-
ample if he were ill or away, without losing the right to serve when needed
again. If he refused because his other duties were under the federal ap-
pointment, rather than the state, he should not lose his rights to retain
this special status. Thus, the court can be justified in allowing the retired
judge to temporarily withdraw his certificate of willingness to serve, and
retain the right to later resume retirement status and pay.
The suggestion raised by the dissenting opinion,'0 that a retired state
officer may be violating the constitutional prohibition" against dual-office
holding, can be answered by the definition of an "officer". One holding an
office must perform 2 a continuous duty or service,38 in a permanent posit-
ion34 where he exercises a public trust, 5 including a portion of the sovereign
authority.3 0 In the instant case the retired judge cannot be considered to be
holding office while on retired status, and certainly not while rights to that
status and'to retirement pay have been waived.
However, the court did not rule on this question, so any future decision
involving it could be decided either way. The tendency of Florida opinions
on the nature of a pension right appears to differ from the trend elsewhere.
A similar trend could develop on the problem of dual-office holding, in
connection with the retired status of the Florida judiciary.
TAXATION-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE LICENSE
AND PRIVILEGE TAX ON MOTOR VEHICLES
A Maryland statute' requires the payment of a vehicle registration tax
on all vehicles operating in interstate commerce within the state borders.
The tax is upon the purchase price of the vehicles. Plaintiff, an interstate
common carrier, sought to operate its busses within the state without paying
the tax. It was contended that such a tax is a burden on interstate com-
merce in that the formula of taxation has no reltaionship to the actual use or
the regulation of the state highways. Held, that the tax is valid and enforce-
able. The state has a right to fair compensation for the use of its highways
30. Gay v. Whitehurst, supra note 26, at 433.
31. FLA. CONST. Art. 15, § 15.
32. Reed v. Sehon, 2 Cal. App. 55, 83 Poc. 77 (1905).
33. Reed v. Sehon, supra note 32; Advisory. Opinion to Governor, 146 Fla. 622, 1
So.2d 636 (1941). "
.34. Advisory Opinion to Governor, supra note 33; Fennell v. Silmot, 127 Misc. 791,
217 N.Y. Supp. 477 (1926).
35. Advisory Opinion to Governor, supra note 33; Harris v. Watson, 201 N.C.
661, 161 S.E. 215 (1931).
36. Abbott v. McNutt, 218 Cal. 225, 22 P.2d 510; State ex ret Drcsshell v. Miami,
153 Fla. 90, 13 So.2d 707 (1943).
1. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws, art. 66 , §25A, art. 81, §218 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
